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Abstract
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central
problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the
past decades and analytical solutions are known for only a few simple settings. Computational
approaches to the problem through the use of LPs have their own set of limitations. Building on the
success of deep learning, a new approach was recently proposed by Duetting et al. (2019) in which
the auction is modeled by a feed-forward neural network and the design problem is framed as a
learning problem. The neural architectures used in that work are general purpose and do not take
advantage of any of the symmetries the problem could present, such as permutation equivariance.
In this work, we consider auction design problems that have permutation-equivariant symmetry
and construct a neural architecture that is capable of perfectly recovering the permutation-
equivariant optimal mechanism, which we show is not possible with the previous architecture.
We demonstrate that permutation-equivariant architectures are not only capable of recovering
previous results, they also have better generalization properties.
1 Introduction
Designing truthful auctions is one of the core problems that arise in economics. Concrete
examples of auctions include sales of treasury bills by the US government, art sales by Christie’s
or Google Ads. Following seminal work of Vickrey (Vickrey, 1961) and Myerson (Myerson, 1981),
auctions are typically studied in the independent private valuations model: each bidder has a
valuation function over items, and their payoff depends only on the items they receive. Moreover, the
auctioneer knows aggregate information about the population that each bidder comes from, modeled
as a distribution over valuation functions, but does not know precisely each bidder’s valuation.
Auction design is challenging since the valuations are private and bidders need to be encouraged to
report their valuations truthfully. The auctioneer aims at designing an incentive compatible auction
that maximizes revenue.
∗Corresponding author: jrahme@princeton.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
01
49
7v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
0 J
un
 20
20
While auction design has existed as a subfield of economic theory for several decades, complete
characterizations of the optimal auction only exist for a few settings. Myerson resolved the optimal
auction design problem when there is a single item for sale (Myerson, 1981). However, the problem
is not completely understood even in the extremely simple setting with just a single bidder and
two items. While there have been some partial characterizations (Manelli and Vincent, 2006, 2010;
Pavlov, 2011; Wang and Tang, 2014; Daskalakis et al., 2017), and algorithmic solutions with provable
guarantees (Alaei, 2011; Alaei et al., 2012, 2013; Cai et al., 2012a,b), neither the analytic nor
algorithmic approach currently appears tractable for seemingly small instances.
Another line of work to confront this theoretical hurdle consists in building automated methods
to find the optimal auction. Early works (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002, 2004) framed the problem
as a linear program. However, this approach suffers from severe scalablility issues as the number of
constraints and variables is exponential in the number of bidders and items (Guo and Conitzer, 2010).
Later, Sandholm and Likhodedov (2015) designed algorithms to find the optimal auction. While
scalable, they are however limited to specific classes of auctions known to be incentive compatible. A
more recent research direction consists in building deep learning architectures that design auctions
from samples of bidder valuations. Duetting et al. (2019) proposed RegretNet, a feed-forward archi-
tecture to find near-optimal results in several known multi-item settings and obtain new mechanisms
in unknown cases. This architecture however is not data efficient and can require a large number
of valuation samples to learn an optimal auction in some cases. This inefficiency is not specific to
RegretNet but is characteristic of neural network architectures that do not incorporate any inductive
bias.
In this paper, we build a deep learning architecture for multi-bidder symmetric auctions. These
are auctions which are invariant to relabeling the items or bidders. More specifically, such auctions
are anonymous (in that they can be executed without any information about the bidders, or labeling
them) and item-symmetric (in that it only matters what bids are made for an item, and not its a
priori label).
It is now well-known that when bidders come from the same population that the optimal auction
itself is anonymous. Similarly, if items are a priori indistinguishable (e.g. different colors of the
same car — individuals certainly value a red vs. blue car differently, but there is nothing objectively
more/less valuable about a red vs. blue car), the optimal auction is itself item-symmetric. So in
such settings, our approach will still approach the true optimum (but with better generalization,
and in a way which retains this structure, see Contributions below). Even without these conditions,
the optimal auction is often symmetric anyway: for example, “bundling together” (the auction which
allows bidders to pay a fixed price for all items, or receive nothing) is item-symmetric, and is often
optimal even when the items are a priori distinguishable.
Beyond their frequent optimality, such auctions are desirable objects of study even when they
are suboptimal. For example, seminal work of Hartline and Roughgarden which pioneered the study
of “simple vs. optimal auctions” analyzes the approximation guarantees achievable by anonymous
auctions (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009), and exciting recent work continues to improve these
guarantees (Alaei et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2019a,c,b). Similarly, Daskalakis and Weinberg develop
algorithms for item-symmetric instances (Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012), and exciting recent
work show how to leverage item-symmetric to achieve near-optimal auctions in completely general
settings (Kothari et al., 2019). To summarize: symmetric auctions are known to be optimal in
many settings of interest (even those which are not themselves symmetric). Even in settings where
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they are not optimal, they are known to yield near-optimal auctions. And even when they are only
approximately optimal, seminal work has identified them as important objects of study owing to
their simplicity.1 While applying existing feed-forward architectures as RegretNet to symmetric
auctions is possible, we show in §3 that RegretNet struggles to find symmetric auctions, even when
the optimum is symmetric. To be clear, the architecture’s performance is indeed quite close to
optimal, but the resulting auction is not “close to symmetric”. This paper proposes an architecture
that outputs a symmetric auction symmetry by design.
Contributions
This paper presents a neural network architecture, EquivariantNet, that outputs symmetric
auctions. This architecture is parameter-efficient and is able to recover some of the optimal results
in the symmetric auctions literature. Our approach outlines three important benefits:
– Symmetry : our architecture outputs a symmetric auction by design. It is immune to
permutation-sensitivity and exploitability as defined in 3.1.
– Sample generalization: Because we use domain knowledge, our architecture converges to the
optimum with fewer valuation samples.
– Out-of-setting generalization: Our architecture does not require hard-coding the number of
bidders or items during training — training our architecture on instances with n bidders and
m items produces a well-defined auction even for instances with n′ bidders and m′ items.
Somewhat surprisingly, we show in §4 some examples where our architecture trained on 1
bidder with 5 items generalizes well even to 1 bidder and m items, for any m ∈ {2, 10}.
EquivariantNet is an adaption of the deep sets architecture (Hartford et al., 2018) to symmetric
auctions. We highlight that the novelty of this paper is not on proposing a new architecture but rather
on adapting an existing method to return symmetric auctions and providing new understanding
on these auctions. Our architecture can be seen as a tool for researchers to confirm or refute
hypotheses and for this reason, we run our experiments on synthetic data. The paper decomposes
as follows. §2 introduces the standard notions of auction design. §3 presents our permutation-
equivariant architecture to encode symmetric auctions. Finally, §4 presents numerical evidence for
the effectiveness of our approach.
Related work
Auction design and machine learning. Machine learning and computational learning theory
have been used in several ways to design auctions from samples of bidder valuations. Some works
have focused sample complexity results for designing optimal revenue-maximizing auctions. This has
been established in single-parameter settings (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015; Cole and Roughgarden,
2014; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Medina and Mohri, 2014; Huang et al., 2018; Devanur
et al., 2016; Hartline and Taggart, 2019; Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan,
2017; Guo et al., 2019), multi-item auctions (Dughmi et al., 2014; Gonczarowski and Weinberg,
2018), combinatorial auctions (Balcan et al., 2016; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016; Syrgkanis,
2017) and allocation mechanisms (Narasimhan and Parkes, 2016). Machine learning has also been
used to optimize different aspects of mechanisms (Lahaie, 2011; Dütting et al., 2015). All these
aforementioned differ from ours as we resort to deep learning for finding optimal auctions.
1In modern discussion of auctions, they are also desirable due to fairness considerations.
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Auction design and deep learning. While Duetting et al. (2019) is the first paper to design
auctions through deep learning, several other paper followed-up this work. Feng et al. (2018) extended
it to budget constrained bidders, Golowich et al. (2018) to the facility location problem. Tacchetti
et al. (2019) built architectures based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions. Recently, Shen et al.
(2019) and Duetting et al. (2019) proposed architectures that exactly satisfy incentive compatibility
but are specific to single-bidder settings. In this paper, we aim at multi-bidder settings and build
permutation-equivariant networks that return nearly incentive compatibility symmetric auctions.
2 Symmetries and learning problem in auction design
We review the framework of auction design and the problem of finding truthful mechanisms.
We then present symmetric auctions and similarly to Duetting et al. (2019), frame auction design as
a learning problem.
2.1 Auction design and symmetries
Auction design. We consider the setting of additive auctions with n bidders with N = {1, . . . , n}
and m items with M = {1, . . . ,m}. Each bidder i is has value vij for item j, and values the set S
of items at
∑
j∈S vij . Such valuations are called additive, and are perhaps the most well-studied
valuations in multi-item auction design (Hart and Nisan, 2012, 2013; Li and Yao, 2013; Babaioff
et al., 2014; Daskalakis et al., 2014; Hart and Reny, 2015; Cai et al., 2016; Daskalakis et al., 2017;
Beyhaghi and Weinberg, 2019).
The designer does not know the full valuation profile V = (vij)i∈N,j∈M , but just a distribution
from which they are drawn. Specifically, the valuation vector of bidder i for each of the m items
~vi = (vi1, . . . , vim) is drawn from a distribution Di over Rm (and then, V is drawn from D := ×iDi).
The designer asks the bidders to report their valuations (potentially untruthfully), then decides on
an allocation of items to the bidders and charges a payment to them.
Definition 1. An auction is a pair (g, p) consisting of a randomized allocation rule g = (g1, . . . , gn)
where gi : Rn×m → [0, 1]m such that for all V , and all j,
∑
i(gi(V ))j 6 1 and payment rules
p = (p1, . . . , pn) where pi : Rn×m → R>0 .
Given reported bids B = (bij)i∈N,j∈M , the auction computes an allocation probability g(B) and
payments p(B). [gi(B)]j is the probability that bidder i received object j and pi(B) is the price
bidder i has to pay to the mechanism. In what follows,M denotes the class of all possible auctions.
Definition 2. The utility of bidder i is defined by ui(~vi, B) =
∑m
j=1[gi(B)]jvij − pi(B).
Bidders seek to maximize their utility and may report bids that are different from their valuations.
Let V−i be the valuation profile without element ~vi, similarly for B−i and D−i = ×j 6=iDj . We aim at
auctions that invite bidders to bid their true valuations through the notion of incentive compatibility.
Definition 3. An auction (g, p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if each bidder’s
utility is maximized by reporting truthfully no matter what the other bidders report. For every bidder
i, valuation ~vi ∈ Di, bid ~bi ′ ∈ Di and bids B−i ∈ D−i, ui(~vi, (~vi, B−i)) > ui(~vi, (~bi ′, B−i)).
Additionally, we aim at auctions where each bidder receives a non-negative utility.
Definition 4. An auction is individually rational (IR) if for all i ∈ N, ~vi ∈ Di and B−i ∈ D−i,
ui(~vi, (~vi, B−i)) > 0. (IR)
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In a DSIC auction, the bidders have the incentive to truthfully report their valuations and
therefore, the revenue on valuation profile V is defined as
∑n
i=1 pi(V ). Optimal auction design aims
at finding a DSIC auction that maximizes the expected revenue rev := EV∼D[
∑n
i=1 pi(V )].
Linear program. We frame the problem of optimal auction design as an optimization problem
where we seek an auction that minimizes the negated expected revenue among all IR and DSIC
auctions. Since there is no known characterization of DSIC mechanisms in the multi-bidder setting,
we resort to the relaxed notion of ex-post regret. It measures the extent to which an auction violates
DSIC, for each bidder.
Definition 5. The ex-post regret for a bidder i is the maximum increase in his utility when considering
all his possible bids and fixing the bids of others. For a valuation profile V , the ex-post regret for a
bidder i is rgti(V ) = max~vi ′∈Rm ui(~vi; (~vi
′, V−i))− ui(~vi; (~vi, V−i)). In particular, DSIC is equivalent
to
rgti(V ) = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (IC)
Therefore, by setting (IC) and (IR) as constraints, finding an optimal auction is equivalent to
the following linear program
min
(g,p)∈M
− EV∼D
[
n∑
i=1
pi(V )
]
s.t. rgti(V ) = 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∀V ∈ D,
ui(~vi, (~vi, B−i)) > 0, ∀i ∈ N, ~vi ∈ Di, B−i ∈ D−i.
(LP)
Symmetric auctions. (LP) is intractable due to the exponential number of constraints. However,
in the setting of symmetric auctions, it is possible to reduce the search space of the problem as
shown in Theorem 1. We first define the notions of bidder- and item-symmetries.
Definition 6. The valuation distribution D is bidder-symmetric if for any permutation of the bidders
ϕb : N → N, the permuted distribution Dϕb := Dϕb(1) × · · · ×Dϕb(n) satifies: Dϕb = D.
Bidder-symmetry intuitively means that the bidders are a priori indistinguishable (although
individual bidders will be different). This holds for instance in auctions where the identity of the
bidders is anonymous, or if Di = Dj for all i, j (bidders are i.i.d.).
Definition 7. Bidder i’s valuation distribution Di is item-symmetric if for any items x1, . . . , xm
and any permutation ϕo : M →M, Di(xϕo(1), . . . , xϕo(m)) = Di(x1, . . . , xm).
Intuitively, item-symmetry means that the items are also indistinguishable but not identical. It
holds when the distributions over the items are i.i.d. but this is not a necessary condition. Indeed,
the distribution {(a, b, c) ∈ U(0, 1)⊗3 : a+ b+ c = 1} is not i.i.d. but is item-symmetric.
Definition 8. An auction is symmetric if its valuation distributions are bidder- and item-symmetric.
We now define the notion of permutation-equivariance that is important in symmetric auctions.
Definition 9. The functions g and p are permutation-equivariant if for any two permutation
matrices Πn ∈ {0, 1}n×n and Πm ∈ {0, 1}m×m, and any valuation matrix V , we have g(Πn V Πm) =
Πn g(V ) Πm and p(Πn V Πm) = Πn p(V ).
Theorem 1. When the auction is symmetric, there exists an optimal solution to (LP) that is
permutation-equivariant.
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Theorem 1 is originally proved in Daskalakis and Weinberg (2012) and its proof is reminded
in App. B for completeness. It encourages to reduce the search space in (LP) by only optimizing
over permutation-equivariant allocations and payments. We implement this idea in Section 3 where
we build equivariant neural network architectures. Before, we frame auction design as a learning
problem.
2.2 Auction design as a learning problem
Similarly to Duetting et al. (2019), we formulate auction design as a learning problem. We
learn a parametric set of auctions (gw, pw) where w ∈ Rd parameters and d ∈ N. Directly solving
(LP) is challenging in practice. Indeed, the auctioneer must have access to the bidder valuations
which are unavailable to her. Since she has access to the valuation distribution, we relax (LP) and
replace the IC constraint for all V ∈ D by the expected constraint EV∼D[rgti(V )] = 0 for all i ∈ N..
In practice, the expectation terms are computed by sampling L bidder valuation profiles drawn i.i.d.
from D. The empirical ex-post regret for bidder i is
r̂gti(w) =
1
L
L∑
`=1
max
~vi ′∈Rm
uwi (~v
(`)
i ; (~vi
′, V (`)−i ))− ui(~v(`)i ; (~v(`)i , V (`)−i )), (Rˆ)
where uwi (~vi, B) :=
∑m
j=1[g
w
i (B)]jvij − pwi (B) is the utility of bidder i under the parametric set of
auctions (gw, pw). Therefore, the learning formulation of (LP) is
min
w∈Rd
− 1
L
L∑
`=1
n∑
i=1
pwi (V
(`)) s.t. r̂gti(w) = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (L̂P)
Duetting et al. (2019) justify the validity of this reduction from (LP) to (L̂P) by showing that
the gap between the expected regret and the empirical regret is small as the number of samples
increases. Additionally to being DSIC, the auction must satisfy IR. The learning problem (L̂P) does
not ensure this but we will show how to include this requirement in the architecture in §3.
3 Permutation-equivariant neural network architecture
We first show that feed-forward architectures as RegretNet (Duetting et al., 2019) may struggle
to find a symmetric solution in auctions where the optimal solution is known to be symmetric.
We then describe our neural network architecture, EquivariantNet that learns symmetric auctions.
EquivariantNet is build using exchangeable matrix layers (Hartford et al., 2018).
3.1 Feed-forward nets and permutation-equivariance
In the following experiments we use the RegretNet architecture with the exact same training
procedure and parameters as found in Duetting et al. (2019) .
Permutation-sensitivity. Given L bidders valuation samples {B(1), . . . , B(L)} ∈ Rn×m, we gener-
ate for each bid matrix B(`) all its possible permutations B(`)Πn,Πm := ΠnB
(`)Πm, where Πn ∈ {0, 1}n×n
and Πm ∈ {0, 1}m×m are permutation matrices. We then compute the revenue for each one of these
bid matrices and obtain a revenue matrix R ∈ Rn!m!×L. Finally, we compute hR ∈ RL where
[hR]j = maxi∈[n!m!]Rij − mini∈[n!m!]Rij . The distribution given by the entries of hR is a mea-
sure of how close the auction is to permutation-equivariance. A symmetric mechanism satisfies
hR = (0, . . . , 0)
>. Our numerical investigation considers the following auction settings:
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– (I) One bidder and two items, the item values are drawn from U [0, 1]. Optimal revenue: 0.55
Manelli and Vincent (2006).
– (II) Four bidders and five items, the item values are drawn from U [0, 1].
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: (a)-(b): Distribution hR when varying the number of training samples (a) 500 000 (b)
5000 samples. (c): Histogram of the distribution hR for setting (II). (d): Maximum revenue loss
when varying the number of bidders for setting (IIIn)
.
Fig. 1 (a)-(b) presents the distribution of hR of the optimal auction learned for setting (I)
when varying the number of samples L. When L is large, the distribution is almost concentrated
at zero and therefore the network is almost able to recover the permutation-equivariant solution.
When L is small, hR is less concentrated around zero and therefore, the solution obtained is non
permutation-equivariant.
As the problem’s dimensions increase, this lack of permutation-invariance becomes more dramatic.
Fig. 1 (c) shows hR for the optimal auction mechanism learned for setting (II) when trained with
5 · 105 samples. Contrary to (I), almost no entry of hR is located around zero, they are concentrated
around between 0.1 and 0.4 i.e. between 3.8% and 15% of the estimated optimal revenue.
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Figure 2: Left: Auction design setting. Right: EquivariantNet: Deep permutation-equivariant
architecture for auction design. Deep PE denotes the deep permutation-equivariant architecture
described in §3.2,
∑
the sum over rows/columns operations, × the multiplication operations, soft
stands for soft-max and the curve for sigmoid. The network outputs an allocation g and a payment
p.
Exploitability. Finally, to highlight how important equivariant solutions are, we analyze the worst-
revenue loss that the auctioneer can incur when the bidders act adversarially. Indeed, since different
permutations can result in different revenues for the auction, cooperative bidders could pick among
the n! possible permutations of their labels the one that minimized the revenue of the mechanism
and present themselves in that order. Instead of getting a revenue of Ropt = EV∼D [
∑n
i=1 pi(V )],
the auctioneer would get a revenue of Radv = EV∼D [minΠn{
∑n
i=1 pi(ΠnV )}]. The percentage of
revenue loss is given by l = 100× Ropt−RadvRopt . We compute l in in the following family of settings:
– (IIIn) n additive bidders and ten item where the item values are drawn from U [0, 1].
In Fig. 1 (d) we plot l(n) the loss in revenue as a function of n. As the number of bidders increases,
the loss becomes more substantial getting over the 8% with only 6 bidders. Permutation-sensitivity
and exploitability of fully connected architectures highlight the importance of aiming for symmetric
auctions. To this end, we design a permutation-equivariant architecture.
3.2 Architecture for symmetric auctions (EquivariantNet)
Our input is a bid matrix B = (bi,j) ∈ Rn×m drawn from a bidder-symmetric and item-symmetric
distribution. We aim at learning a randomized allocation neural network gw : Rn×m → [0, 1]n×m
and a payment network pw : Rn×m → Rn>0. The symmetries of the distribution from which B is
drawn and Theorem 1 motivates us to model gw and pw as permutation-equivariant functions.
To this end, we use exchangeable matrix layers (Hartford et al., 2018) and their definition is re-
minded in App. A. We now describe the three modules of the allocation and payment networks Fig. 2.
The first network outputs a vector qw(B) ∈ [0, 1]m such that entry qwj (B) is the probability
that item j is allocated to any of the n bidders. The architecture consists of three modules. The
first one is a deep permutation-equivariant network with tanh activation functions. The output
of that module is a matrix Q ∈ Rn×m. The second module transforms Q into a vector Rm by
taking the average over the rows of Q. We finally apply the sigmoid function to the result to ensure
that qw(B) ∈ [0, 1]m. This architecture ensures that qw(B) is invariant with respect to bidder
8
permutations and equivariant with respect to items permutations.
The second network outputs a matrix h(B) ∈ [0, 1]n×m where hwij is the probability that item
j is allocated to bidder i conditioned on item j being allocated. The architecture consists of a
deep permutation-equivariant network with tanh activation functions followed by softmax activation
function so that
∑n
i=1 h
w
ij(B) = 1. This architecture ensures that q
w equivariant with respect to
object and bidder permutations.
By combining the outputs of qw and hw, we compute the allocation function gw : Rn×m →
[0, 1]n×m where gij(B) is the probability that the allocated item j is given to bidder i. Indeed, using
conditional probabilities, we have gwij(B) = q
w
j (B)h
w
ij(B). Note that g
w is a permutation-equivariant
function.
The third network outputs a vector p(B) ∈ Rn>0 where p˜wi is the fraction of bidder’s i utility that
she has to pay to the mechanism. Given the allocation function gw, bidder i has to pay an amount
pi = p˜i(B)
∑m
j=1 g
w
ij(B)Bij . Individual rationality is ensured by having p˜i ∈ [0, 1]. The architecture
of p˜w is almost similar to the one of qw. Instead of averaging over the rows of the matrix output by
the permutation-equivariant architecture, we average over the columns.
3.3 Optimization and training
The optimization and training procedure of EquivariantNet is similar to Duetting et al. (2019).
For this reason, we briefly mention the outline of this procedure and remind the details in App. C.
We apply the augmented Lagrangian method to (Rˆ). The Lagrangian with a quadratic penalty is:
Lρ(w;λ) = − 1
L
L∑
`=1
∑
i∈N
pwi (V
(`)) +
∑
i∈N
λir̂gti(w) +
ρ
2
(∑
i∈N
r̂gti(w)
)2
,
where λ ∈ Rn is a vector of Lagrange multipliers and ρ > 0 is a fixed parameter controlling the
weight of the quadratic penalty. The solver alternates between the updates on model parameters
and Lagrange multipliers: wnew ∈ argmaxwLρ(wold, λold) and λnewi = λoldi + ρ · r̂gti(wnew), ∀i ∈ N.
4 Experimental Results
We start by showing the effectiveness of our architecture in symmetric and asymmetric auctions.
We then highlight its sample-efficiency for training and its ability to extrapolate to other settings.
More details about the setup and training can be found in App. C and App. D.
Evaluation. In addition to the revenue of the learned auction on a test set, we also evaluate the
corresponding empirical average regret over bidders r̂gt = 1n
∑n
i=1 r̂gti. We evaluate these terms by
running gradient ascent on v′i with a step-size of 0.001 for {300, 500} iterations (we test {100, 300}
different random initial v′i and report the one achieves the largest regret).
Known optimal solution. We first consider instances of single bidder multi-item auctions where
the optimal mechanism is known to be symmetric. While independent private value auction as (I)
fall in this category, the following item-asymmetric auction has surprisingly an optimal symmetric
solution.
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• (IV) One bidder and two items where the item values are independently drawn according
to the probability densities f1(x) = 5/(1 + x)6 and f2(y) = 6/(1 + y)7. Optimal solution in
Daskalakis et al. (2017).
Dist. rev rgt OPT
(I) 0.551 0.00013 0.550
(IV) 0.173 0.00003 0.1706
(V) 0.873 0.001 0.860
(a)
EquivariantNet RegretNet
λ2 rev rgt revF rgtF
0.01 0.37 0.0006 0.39 0.0003
0.1 0.41 0.0004 0.41 0.0007
1 0.86 0.0005 0.84 0.0012
10 3.98 0.0081 3.96 0.0056
(b)
Figure 3: (a): Test revenue and regret for (a) single bidder, 2 items and 2 bidders, 2 items settings.
For this latter, OPT is the optimal revenue from VVCA and AMAbsym families of auctions (Sandholm
and Likhodedov, 2015). (b): Test revenue and regret for setting (VI) when varying λ2 and λ1 = 1.
revF and rgtF are computed with RegretNet (Duetting et al., 2019).
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: (a)-(b): Train and test revenues and regrets as a function of epochs for setting (I).
The two first lines in Fig. 3(a) report the revenue and regret of the mechanism learned by our
model. The revenue is very close to the optimal one, and the regret is negligible. Remark that the
learned auction may achieve a revenue slightly above the optimal incentive compatible auction. This
is possible because although small, the regret is non-zero. Fig. 4(a)-(b) presents a plot of revenue
and regret as a function of training epochs for the setting (I).
Unknown optimal solution. Our architecture is also able to recover a permutation-equivariant
solution in settings for which the optimum is not known analytically such as:
– (V) Two additive bidders and two items where bidders draw their value for each item from
U [0, 1].
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We compare our solution to the optimal auctions from the VVCA and AMAbsym families of
incentive compatible auctions from (Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015). The last line of Fig. 3(a)
summarizes our results.
Non-symmetric optimal solution. Our architecture returns satisfactory results in asymmetric
auctions. (VI) is a setting where there may not be permutation-equivariant solutions.
– (VI) Two bidders and two items where the item values are independently drawn according to
the probability densities f1(x) = λ−11 e
−λ1x and f2(y) = λ−12 e
−λ2y, where λ1, λ2 > 0.
Fig. 3(b) shows the revenue and regret of the final auctions learned for setting (VI). When
λ1 = λ2, the auction is symmetric and so, the revenue of the learned auction is very close to the
optimal revenue, with negligibly small regret. However, as we increase the gap between λ1 and λ2,
the asymmetry becomes dominant and the optimal auction does not satisfy permutation-equivariance.
We remark that our architecture does output a solution with near-optimal revenue and small regret.
Sample-efficiency. Our permutation-equivariant architecture exhibits solid generalization prop-
erties when compared to the feed-forward architecture RegretNet. When enough data is available
at training, both architectures generalize well to unseen data and the gap between the training
and test losses goes to zero. However, when fewer training samples are available, our equivariant
architecture generalizes while RegretNet struggles to. This may be explained by the inductive bias in
our architecture. We demonstrate this for auction (V) with a training set of 20 samples and plot the
training and test losses as a function of time (measures in epochs) for both architectures in Fig. 5(a).
Figure 5: Train and test losses (V) with 20 training samples.
Out-of-setting generalization. The number of parameters in our permutation-equivariant archi-
tecture does not depend on the size of the input. Given an architecture that was trained on samples
of size (n,m), it is possible to evaluate it on samples of any size (n′,m′). This evaluation is not well
defined for feed-forward architectures where the dimension of the weights depends on the input size.
We use this advantage to check whether models trained in a fixed setting perform well in totally
different ones.
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– (α) Train an equivariant architecture on 1 bidder, 5 items and test it on 1 bidder, n items for
n = 2 · · · 10. All the items values are sampled independently from U [0, 1].
– (β) Train an equivariant architecture on 2 bidders, 3 objects and test it on 2 bidders, n objects
for n = 2 · · · 6. All the items values are sampled independently from U [0, 1].
Fig. 6(a)-(b) reports the test revenue that we get for different values of n in (α) and (β) and compares
it to the empirical optimal revenue. Our baseline for that is RegretNet. Surprisingly, our model does
generalize well. It is worth mentioning that knowing how to solve a larger problem such as 1× 5
does not automatically result in a capacity to solve a smaller one such as 1× 2; the generalization
does happen on both ends. Our approach looks promising regarding out of setting generalization.
It generalizes well when the number of objects varies and the number of bidders remain constants.
However, generalization to settings where the number of bidders varies is more difficult due to the
complex interactions between bidders. We do not observe good generalization with our current
method.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: (a): Generalization revenue versus RegretNet for experiment (α). (b): Generalization
revenue versus RegretNet for experiment (β).
Conclusion
We have explored the effect of adding domain knowledge in neural network architectures for
auction design. We built a permutation-equivariant architecture to design symmetric auctions
and highlighted its multiple advantages. It recovers several known optimal results and provides
competitive results in asymmetric auctions. Compared to fully connected architectures, it is more
sample efficient and is able to generalize to settings it was not trained on. In a nutshell, this paper
insists on the importance of bringing domain-knowledge to the deep learning approaches for auctions.
Our architecture presents some limitations. It assumes that all the bidders and items are
permutation-equivariant. However, in some real-world auctions, the item/bidder-symmetry only
holds for a group of bidders/items. More advanced architectures such as Equivariant Graph
Networks Maron et al. (2018) may solve this issue. Another limitation is that we only consider
additive valuations. An interesting direction would be to extend our approach to other settings as
unit-demand or combinatorial auctions.
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A Permutation-equivariant network
In this section, we remind exchangeable matrix layers introduced by (Hartford et al., 2018),
that are a generalization of the deep sets architecture (Zaheer et al., 2017). We briefly describe this
architecture here and invite the reader to look at the original paper for details.
The architecture consists in several layers and each of them is constituted of multiple channels.
Each layer takes as inputK channels and outputs O channels. Let B(k) and Y (o) denote such channels.
Cross-channel interactions are fully connected: we have five unique parameters w(k,o)1 , . . . , w
(k,o)
4 for
each combination of input-output channels and the bias parameter w5 does not depend on the input.
The element (i, j) of the o-th output channel is
Y
(o)
i,j = σ
 K∑
k=1
w
(k,o)
1 B
(k)
i,j +
w
(k,o)
2
n
∑
i′
B
(k)
i′,j +
w
(k,o)
3
m
∑
j′
B
(k)
i,j′ +
w
(k,o)
4
nm
∑
i′,j′
B
(k)
i′,j′ + w
(o)
5
 (1)
Each layer preserves permutation-equivariance since we only apply sums over lines and columns of
X(k) in (1). By stacking multiple layers (1), we build a deep permutation-equivariant network.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Notation: For a matrix B ∈ Rnm we will denote the ith line by Bi ∈ Rm or [B]i ∈ Rm.Let D
denote an equivariant distribution on Rnm . Let g : Rnm → Rnm and p : Rnm → Rn be solutions to
the following problem:
p = argmax EB∼D
[
n∑
i=1
pi(B)
]
subject to:
〈 [g(B)]i , Bi 〉 > pi(B),
and
〈 [g(Bi, B−i)]i , Bi 〉 − pi(Bi, B−i) > 〈 [g(B′i, B−i)]i , Bi 〉 − pi(B′i, B−i), ∀B′i ∈ Rm.
Let Πn and Πm be two permutation matrices of sizes n and m. In particular Πn and Πm are
orthogonal matrices and in the following we use that Π−1n = ΠTn and Π−1m = ΠTm. Let’s define:
gΠn,Πm(B) = Π−1n g(ΠnBΠm) Π
−1
m
pΠn,Πm(B) = Π−1n p(ΠnBΠm).
Let’s prove that if (g, p) is a solution to the problem then so is (gΠn,Πm , pΠn,Πm). First we show
that (gΠn,Πm , pΠn,Πm) still satisfy the previous constraints.
〈[gΠn,Πm(B)]i , Bi 〉 = 〈[Π−1n g(ΠnBΠm)Π−1m ]i , Bi 〉
= 〈[Π−1n g(ΠnBΠm)]iΠ−1m , Bi 〉
= 〈[Π−1n g(ΠnBΠm)]i , BiΠm 〉
= 〈[Π−1n g(ΠnBΠm)]i , [BΠm]i 〉
= 〈[Π−1n g(ΠnBΠm)]i , [BΠm]i 〉.
Let’s denote by ϕ the permutation on the indices corresponding to the Πn permutation. then we
have:
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[Π−1n g(ΠnBΠm)]i = [g(ΠnBΠm)]ϕ−1(i)
[BΠm]i = [ΠnBΠm]ϕ−1(i).
This gives us that:
〈[gΠn,Πm(B)]i , Bi 〉 = 〈[Π−1n g(ΠnBΠm)]i , [BΠm]i 〉
= 〈[g(ΠnBΠm)]ϕ−1(i) , [ΠnBΠm]ϕ−1(i) 〉
> [p(ΠnBΠm)]ϕ−1(i)
= [Π−1n p(ΠnBΠm)]i
= [pΠn,Πm(B)]i.
This shows that (gΠn,Πm , pΠn,Πm) satisfies the first constraint. We now move to the second constraint.
Let’s write B˜ = (B′i, B−i). As a reminder, this is the matrix B where the ith line has been
replaced with B′i. We need to show that:
〈 [gΠn,Πm(B)]i , Bi 〉 − pΠn,Πmi (B) > 〈 [gΠn,Πm(B˜)]i , Bi 〉 − pΠn,Πmi (B˜).
Using the previous computations we find that:
〈 [gΠn,Πm(B)]i , Bi 〉 − pΠn,Πmi (B) = 〈[g(ΠnBΠm)]ϕ−1(i) , [ΠnBΠm]ϕ−1(i) 〉 − [p(ΠnBΠm)]ϕ−1(i),
where ϕ is the permutation associated with Πn. Since g and p satisfy the second constraint we have:
〈 [gΠn,Πm(B)]i , Bi 〉 − pΠn,Πmi (B) = 〈[g(ΠnBΠm)]ϕ−1(i) , [ΠnBΠm]ϕ−1(i) 〉 − [p(ΠnBΠm)]ϕ−1(i)
> 〈[g(Πn B˜Πm)]ϕ−1(i) , [ΠnB˜Πm]ϕ−1(i) 〉 − [p(ΠnB˜Πm)]ϕ−1(i)
= 〈 [gΠn,Πm(B˜)]i , Bi 〉 − pΠn,Πmi (B˜).
This concludes the proof that (gΠn,Πm , pΠn,Πm) satisfy the constraints. Now we have to show
that pΠn,Πm is optimal.
EB∼D
[
n∑
i=1
pΠn,Πm(B)
]
= EB∼D
[〈 pΠn,Πm(B) ,1 〉]
= EB∼D
[〈Π−1n p(ΠnBΠm) ,1 〉]
= EB∼D [〈 p(ΠnBΠm) ,1 〉]
= EB∼D [〈 p(B) ,1 〉]
= EB∼D
[
n∑
i=1
pi(B)
]
,
where we used that Π−1n = ΠTn , Πn1 = 1 and that ΠnBΠm ∼ D sinceD is an equivariant distribution.
This shows that if p is optimal then pΠn,Πm is also optimal since they have the same expectation.
We conclude that (gΠn,Πm , pΠn,Πm) is an optimal solution. Let’s define
g˜(B) = EΠn,Πm
[
gΠn,Πm(B)
]
p˜(B) = EΠn,Πm
[
pΠn,Πm(B)
]
.
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Here, in the expectation, Πn and Πm are drawn uniformly at random. Since the problem and
constraints are convex, (g˜, p˜) is also an optimal solution to the problem as a convex combination of
optimal solutions. Let’s prove that g˜ and p˜ are equivariant functions.
g˜(ΠnBΠm) = EΠ′n,Π′m
[
gΠ
′
n,Π
′
m(ΠnBΠm)
]
= EΠ′n,Π′m
[
Π′n
−1
g(Π′m ΠnBΠm Π
′
m)Π
′
m
−1]
= Πn
−1 EΠ′n,Π′m
[
(Π′nΠn)
−1
g(Π′n ΠnBΠm Π
′
m)(ΠmΠ
′
m)
−1]
Πm
−1.
If Π′n and Π′m are uniform among permutation then so is Π′nΠn and Π′mΠm. So through a change of
variable we find that:
g˜(ΠnBΠm) = Πn
−1 EΠ′n,Π′m
[
Π′n
−1
g(Π′nBΠ
′
m)Π
′
m
−1]
Πm
−1
= Πn
−1 g˜(B) Πm−1.
This shows that g˜ is equivariant. The proof that p˜ is equivariant is similar.
p˜(ΠnBΠm) = EΠ′n,Π′m
[
pΠ
′
n,Π
′
m(ΠnBΠm)
]
= EΠ′n,Π′m
[
Π′n
−1
p(Π′m ΠnBΠm Π
′
m)
]
= Πn
−1 EΠ′n,Π′m
[
(Π′nΠn)
−1
p(Π′n ΠnBΠm Π
′
m)
]
.
By doing a change of variable as before we find:
p˜(ΠnBΠm) = Πn
−1 EΠ′n,Π′m
[
Π′n
−1
p(Π′nBΠ
′
m)
]
= Πn
−1 p˜(B),
(g˜, p˜) is an equivariant optimal solution, this concludes the proof.
C Optimization and training procedures
Our training algorithm is the same as the one found in Duetting et al. (2019). We made that
choice to better illustrate the intrinsic advantages of our permutation equivariant architecture. We
include implementation details here for completeness and additional details can be found in the
original paper.
We generate a training dataset of valuation profiles S that we then divide into mini-batches of
size B. Typical sizes for S are {5000, 50000, 500000} and typical batch sizes are {50, 500, 50000}.
We train our networks over for several epochs (typically {50, 80}) and we apply a random shuffling
of the training data for each new epoch. We denote the minibatch received at iteration t by
St = {V (1), . . . , V (B)}. The update on model parameters involves an unconstrained optimization of
Lρ over w and is performed using a gradient-based optimizer. Let r̂gti(w) be the empirical regret in
(Rˆ) computed on mini-batch St. The gradient of Lρ with respect to w is given by:
∇wLρ(w) = − 1
B
B∑
`=1
∑
i∈N
∇wpwi (V (`))
+
∑
i∈N
B∑
`=1
λtig`,i + ρt
∑
i∈N
B∑
`=1
r̂gti(w)g`,i,
(2)
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Algorithm 1 Training Algorithm
1: Input: Minibatches S1, . . . ,ST of size B
2: Parameters: γ > 0, η > 0, c > 0, R ∈ N, T ∈ N, Tρ ∈ N, Tλ ∈ N.
3: Initialize Parameters: ρ0 ∈ R, w0 ∈ Rd, λ0 ∈ Rn,
4: Initialize Misreports: v′i
(`) ∈ Vi, ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ N.
5:
6: for t = 0, . . . , T do
7: Receive minibatch St = {V (1), . . . , V (B)}.
8: for r = 0, . . . , R do
9: ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ n :
v′i
(`) ← v′i(`) + γ∇v′iu
wt
i (vi
(`); (v′i
(`)
, V
(`)
−i ))
10:
11: Get Lagrangian gradient using (2) and update wt:
12: wt+1 ← wt − η∇wLρt(wt).
13:
14: Update ρ once in Tρ iterations:
15: if t is a multiple of Tρ then
16: ρt+1 ← ρt + c
17: else
18: ρt+1 ← ρt
19:
20: Update Lagrange multipliers once in Tλ iterations:
21: if t is a multiple of Tλ then
22: λt+1i ← λti + ρt r̂gti(wt), ∀i ∈ N
23: else
24: λt+1 ← λt
where
g`,i = ∇w
[
max
v′i∈Vi
uwi (v
(`)
i ; (v
′
i, V
(`)
−i ))− uwi (v(`)i ; (v(`)i , V (`)−i ))
]
.
The terms r̂gti and g`,i requires us to compute the maximum over misreports for each bidder i and
valuation profile `. To compute this maximum we optimize the function v′i → uwi (v(`)i ; (v′i, V (`)−i ))
using another gradient based optimizer.
For each i and valuation profile `, we maintain a misreports valuation v′i
(`). For every update
on the model parameters wt, we perform R gradient updates to compute the optimal misreports:
v′i
(`) = v′i
(`) + γ∇
v′i
(`)uwi (v
(`)
i ; (v
′
i
(`), V
(`)
−i )), for some γ > 0. In our experiments, we use the Adam
optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2014) for updates on model w and v′i
(`). Typical values are R = 25
and γ = 0.001 for the training phase. During testing, we use a larger number of step sizes Rtest to
compute these optimal misreports and we try bigger number initialization, Ninit, that are drawn from
the same distribution of the valuations. Typical values are Rtest = {200, 300} and Ninit = {100, 300}.
When the valuations are constrained to an interval (for instance [0, 1]), this optimization inner loop
becomes constrained and we make sure that the values we get for v′i are realistic by projecting them
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to their domain after each gradient step.
The parameters λt and ρt in the Lagrangian are not constant but they are updated over time.
ρt is initialized at a value ρ0 is incremented every Tρ iterations, ρt+1 ← ρt + c. Typical values are
ρ0 = {0.25, 1}, c = {0.25, 1, 5} and Tρ = {2, 5} epochs. λt is initialized at a value λ0 is updates every
Tλ iterations according to λt+1i ← λti + ρt r̂gti(wt),∀i ∈ N . Typical values are λ0i = {0.25, 1, 5} and
Tλ = {2} iterations.
D Setup
We implemented our experiments using PyTorch. A typical deep exchangeable network consists
of 3 hidden layers of 25 channels each. Depending on the experiment, we generated a dataset of
{5000, 50000, 500000} valuation profiles and chose mini batches of sizes {50, 500, 5000} for training.
The optimization of the augmented Lagrangian was typically run for {50, 80} epochs. The value of ρ
in the augmented Lagrangian was set to 1.0 and incremented every 2 epochs. An update on wt was
performed for every mini-batch using the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001. For each
update wt, we ran R = 25 misreport update steps with a learning rate of 0.001. An update on λt
was performed once every 100 minibatches.
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